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Fiduciary Duties of Directors When Managing
Intellectual Property
By Irah H. Donner *
ABSTRACT
The law covering corporate director duties pertaining to management of
intellectual property assets is evolving, making it important for directors to remain up-todate on any and all changes in management procedures and best practices. Generally,
courts treat intellectual property assets like any other corporate asset, which means
directors must approach intellectual property with the same due care as they would any
other asset.
For example, directors must be informed of the value of their intellectual property
and always remember their duty of loyalty to their shareholders. Similarly, courts require
directors to implement necessary internal controls to protect their corporation’s
intellectual property assets. Finally, directors must refrain from misappropriating
intellectual property.
Recent cases include DuPont v. Medtronic Vascular, where the Superior Court of
Delaware acknowledged that corporate officers and directors may have an affirmative duty
to monetize their corporation’s intellectual property, including the use of litigation if
necessary. 1 Furthermore, the Securities and Exchange Commission recently filed a
complaint against CytoGenix Corporation, its president, Lex Cowsert, and a board
member, Christopher Plummer, claiming the defendants lied to investors by issuing false
press releases associated with an influenza vaccine’s development when the corporation
had already lost all of its patents in a prior lawsuit. 2

Mr. Donner is author of the books PATENT PROSECUTION: LAW, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE BEFORE
(9th ed. 2015), and CONSTRUCTING AND DECONSTRUCTING PATENTS (2d ed.
2015), published by Bloomberg BNA Books and was an adjunct professor of law at the American
University, Washington College of Law. Mr. Donner frequently conducts intellectual property (IP) audits,
clearance reviews, transactional due diligence and advises companies on strategies for protecting their IP,
including preparing and prosecuting patent applications. Special thanks to J. Colby Van Horn, Marc P.
Rosenberg and Lauren Brown, all of whom assisted in the preparation of this article.
1
See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Medtronic Vascular, Inc., No. 09-058, 2013 WL 1792824, at
*11 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 24, 2013).
2
See Complaint at 1, Securities and Exchange Commission v. Plummer, No. 14-cv-5441, 2014 WL
3543755 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2014).
*
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I. FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF DIRECTORS
¶1

¶2

¶3

¶4

Under Delaware corporate law, directors of a corporation are required to perform
their duties to the corporation with due care, loyalty, and in good faith. Due care requires
that the directors make informed decisions, which therefore requires directors to be
sufficiently knowledgeable in the subject matter for which such decisions must be made. 3
The duty of loyalty requires that directors take actions in the best interest of the corporation.
The directors must go about their actions in good faith. If such actions are taken in bad
faith, directors’ decisions could face scrutiny and potential liability.
In the current corporate climate, because intellectual property assets tend to comprise
a high percentage of a company’s value (especially for technology companies), the
management of these assets could very well fall within the ambit of directors’ fiduciary
duties.
If a director or a board of directors fails to adequately manage a corporation’s
intellectual property assets, they could be deemed to have breached their fiduciary duty to
the corporation. Under the business judgment rule, courts will defer to a board’s decision
as long as the directors fulfilled their duties to the corporation and their decision was made
with a rational basis. If a director fails to act in good faith or acts on an uninformed basis,
he or she could face scrutiny. In addition, directors could face scrutiny for wasting valuable
corporate assets. A court may find directors breached their duty by not properly managing
the corporation’s assets, amounting to waste. However, as this article discusses further,
the threshold for improper management to be considered wasting a corporate asset is
significant.
Directors also face additional duties under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Intellectual
property may need to be accounted for under the Sarbanes-Oxley disclosure rules, and the
mismanagement of corporate assets by directors could lead, in exceptional cases, to charges
of securities fraud and 10(b) and 10b-5 violations.
II. BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE

¶5

¶6

Generally, because courts believe boards, with the knowledge and tools they have at
their disposal, are better equipped to run their companies than the courts themselves, they
will defer to the judgment of directors in business decisions. 4 However, if the board makes
a decision in bad faith, on an uninformed basis, or if there is no rational business basis for
its decision-making, courts may be unwilling to defer to the board’s judgment. 5
In the intellectual property context, this raises questions as to the extent to which a
board needs to manage such assets, and whether it may defer to the expertise of intellectual
property counsel. Directors have different duties depending on whether they are actively

3
Lyman Johnson, The Modest Business Judgment Rule, 55 BUS. LAW. 625, 630 (2000). Similar rules
may apply in respect to limited liability companies. See, e.g., Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., LLC, 40
A.3d 839, 850–51 (Del. Ch. 2012), aff'd, 59 A.3d 1206 (Del. 2012). In some situations, an LLC operating
agreement may restrict or eliminate a manager’s fiduciary duty of loyalty. See Zimmerman v. Crothall, 62
A.3d 676, 701–04 (Del. Ch. 2013). This restriction of fiduciary duty will likely not affect a manger’s
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See, e.g., 6 Del. C. § 18–1101(c) (prohibiting parties to an LLC
operating agreement from contracting out of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
4
Johnson, supra note 3, at 626–27.
5
Id.
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engaging in buying and selling assets or overseeing the management of the corporation’s
assets.
A. Board Action – Miron
¶7

When a board is determining whether to buy or sell material assets, it will not meet
its fiduciary duties unless it is well-informed on the matter. To stay well-informed,
directors must perform due diligence with respect to the relevant assets. Although, a board
of directors may want to consult with an expert, the board should make its own decision as
to whether or not to buy or sell material assets. A plaintiff shareholder may be able to
overcome the business judgment rule by showing that the process of arriving at a decision
was done in bad faith or on an uninformed basis.
¶8
For example, a shareholder class action lawsuit was filed by ContentGuard Holdings
(“ContentGuard”) against ContentGuard directors and its majority shareholders, Microsoft
Corporation (“Microsoft”), Xerox Corporation (“Xerox”), and Time Warner, Inc. (“Time
Warner”). 6 The majority shareholders (some of whom had members on the ContentGuard
board of directors) tried to obtain extremely broad and valuable intellectual property
licenses from ContentGuard at nominal value. 7 The employee shareholders of
ContentGuard alleged that the majority shareholders and the director defendants breached
their fiduciary duties owed to the employee shareholders. 8
¶9
The complaint alleged that the defendants breached their duties of loyalty and good
faith and fair dealing by causing ContentGuard to license its valuable technology in
exchange for only nominal consideration, and that the defendants prevented ContentGuard
from growing its revenues, earnings and cash flow, thereby acting in bad faith. 9 Although
this case was settled, it highlights the importance of directors being informed on the value
of their intellectual property assets and in this case, the value of their technology licenses.
When deciding whether to license or sell material assets, directors have a duty of loyalty
and care to their shareholders.
¶10
In another class action lawsuit, Tibotec-Virco CVA v. Rompaey, shareholders of
Tibotec-Virco CVA (“Tibotec”) brought an action against Rompaey, a director of
TherapyEdge, Inc. (“TherapyEdge”), a corporation of which Tibotec was a minority
shareholder. 10 TherapyEdge owned very valuable intellectual property, including a
method and system that helped provide treatment programs for HIV patients. 11 The
complaint alleged that Rompaey breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by failing
to exercise due care in managing these material assets. 12
¶11
The shareholders complained that because Rompaey approved the sale of
TherapyEdge assets for inadequate consideration with grossly unfair terms, he breached

6
See Stockholders Derivative and Class Action Complaint, Miron v. Microsoft Corp., No. 1149, 2005
WL 5769566 (Del. Ch. Mar. 4, 2005).
7
See id. ¶ 4.
8
See id.
9
See id. ¶ 55.
10
See Verified Complaint at 2, Tibotec-Virco CVA v. Rompaey, No. 673-N, 2004 WL 2364795 (Del.
Ch. Sept. 1, 2004).
11
Id.
12
Id.
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his duty of care. 13 The shareholders also alleged Rompaey failed to take reasonable steps
to maximize shareholder value when selling TherapyEdge’s assets, and that Rompaey
breached his duty of loyalty and good faith by not acting in the corporation’s best interest. 14
They also alleged that Rompaey failed to maximize shareholder value when he sold the
assets for less than fair consideration, which was detrimental to TherapyEdge, its
shareholders, and, its creditors. 15 This case was eventually settled, but it too shows the
importance of directors fulfilling their fiduciary duties to their companies in the intellectual
property context.
¶12
These cases exemplify the types of claims that shareholders might bring against a
board for breaching its fiduciary duty in the intellectual property context. When a
corporation fails to receive adequate consideration for its material intellectual property
assets, shareholders might claim the directors breached their fiduciary duty to the
corporation and to the shareholders. These cases also demonstrate that directors should
perform adequate due diligence on the value of their material assets before taking any
action in their sale or disposition. Furthermore, in the intellectual property context, board
members must stay well-informed in the acquisition and sale of material intellectual
property assets. It should be noted, however, that in Delaware, the Delaware Code protects
directors from personal liability for breaches of the duty of care, but not for breaches of the
duties of loyalty or good faith. 16
B. Board Inaction – In Re Caremark/Cement Lock
¶13

Not only may boards face scrutiny for actions they take that may breach of their
fiduciary duties, but they also may face liability for their inaction. Though a board must
make major decisions regarding a corporation’s material assets, the board also may be
responsible for the daily management of those assets. In the landmark case In re
Caremark, 17 the Delaware Chancery Court provided guidance on what a board’s duties are
in the ongoing maintenance of corporate assets. In that case, the court acknowledged that
the business judgment rule generally applies to board actions; however, a board cannot turn
a blind eye to the day-to-day management of the corporation and be shielded from liability
because they took no action. 18
¶14
Caremark involved a health care service corporation that was making illegal
payments to doctors who, in return for a kickback from Caremark, would recommend that
their patients use Caremark products. 19 The directors were accused of breaching their
fiduciary duties to the corporation for failing to detect illegal payments that were being
made by the corporation. 20 However, the court found that this failed oversight did not
amount to a breach of their duties. Instead, the court said that, to lose the protection of the

Id.
Id. ¶ 72, 74.
15
Id. ¶ 81.
16
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West 2015).
17
In re Caremark Intern. Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996).
18
See id.
19
Id. at 961–62.
20
Id.
13
14
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¶18

¶19
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business judgment rule, a board must have a “sustained or systematic failure . . . to exercise
oversight . . . .” 21
Caremark leaves open the question of how much oversight is needed by the board.
The only guidance provided by the court was “the level of detail that is appropriate . . . is
a question of business judgment.” 22
In Pereira v. Cogan, a chapter 7 trustee brought an action against a corporate debtor’s
directors for self-dealing and breach of fiduciary duty. 23 Some of the directors had not
voted on certain corporate expenditures and tried to shield themselves from liability by
arguing they had not taken any action at all. 24 The Southern District of New York ruled
that directors, by abstaining from voting on challenged corporate expenditures, could not
insulate themselves from liability. 25 Their decision not to vote thereby lost the protection
of the business judgment rule, and the directors had to prove that their decision not to vote
was based on sound business judgment. 26
In another Southern District of New York case, In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc.,
shareholders brought an action against the directors of the health care plan provider for
“failing to have in place sufficient financial controls and procedures to monitor the planned
conversion to a new computer system . . . .” 27 The court found that demand futility was
properly pled because the shareholders alleged specific facts to show the directors breached
their duties to the corporation by failing to oversee certain procedures. 28
Recently, in Zomolosky v. Kullman, shareholders brought an action against the
directors of DuPont Co., an agricultural products corporation, for demand futility because
the board of directors allegedly failed to prevent willful infringement of a competitor’s
patent. 29 In this case, the shareholders claimed that the board of directors supported
unlawful acts of patent infringement, which resulted in a billion-dollar judgment against
DuPont Co. 30 However, the court ruled that the claim was not properly established because
there was no evidence to show that the directors knew that DuPont Co. was infringing. 31
It is likely that this standard of care and diligence would also apply to the
management of intellectual property assets. However, what is unclear is just how much
oversight is necessary. Because of the highly sophisticated and technical nature of
intellectual property, boards might consider deferring or delegating the management of
those assets to the corporation’s lawyers, including patent and intellectual property counsel.
A director can delegate this power only when it does not abdicate the director’s authority.
Abdication occurs when the board delegates duties that “[lie] at the heart of the
management of the corporation.” 32 This determination is fact specific and may differ from

Id. at 971.
Id. at 970.
23
294 B.R. 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
192 F.R.D. 111, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
28
Id. at 116.
29
70 F. Supp. 3d 595, 598–99 (D. Del 2014).
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Chapin v. Benwood Foundation, Inc., 402 A.2d 1205, 1210 (Del. Ch. 1979).
21
22
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corporation to corporation, given the relative importance of their intellectual property
assets.
For example, in Cement-Lock v. Gas Technology Institute, members of Cement-Lock
Group, LLC (“CLG”) brought a derivative action on behalf of CLG against certain board
members, claiming they failed to institute the necessary internal controls. 33
CLG asserted some of its board members were losing the company revenue through
entering into fraudulent contracts to lease out CLG’s patented decontamination
technology. 34 The District Court in Illinois, applying Delaware law, made clear that the
defendants were “liable not only if they were aware of the [fraud] but also if they should
have been aware of it.” 35 The Court ruled the plaintiffs submitted enough evidence to
withstand defendants’ summary judgment motion. 36
Similarly, in a class action lawsuit against RSA Security, Inc. (“RSA”), shareholders
argued that the directors breached their fiduciary duty of care by not filing for European
patent protection, thereby allowing other companies to use RSA’s technology abroad. 37
Even though this case was settled, the threat of large class actions and settlements is
important for directors to consider in the management of their material intellectual property
assets.
Finally, in an ongoing suit, DuPont shareholders brought a derivative claim against
the corporation’s board for breach of fiduciary duty, asking the court to direct DuPont to
improve its corporate governance. 38 The complaint stems from a $1 billion jury verdict in
2009 against DuPont for patent infringement. 39 In 2002, DuPont crafted a licensing
agreement for herbicide-resistant seeds, which was found to incorporate a rival’s patent. 40
The complaint alleges that DuPont’s board knew it could not rely on the licensing
agreement to manufacture its herbicide-resistant seeds, because the corporation’s rigid
internal controls would have alerted the board that the alleged infringement posed a serious
danger. 41
In a recently filed suit, shareholders asserted claims against Marvell Technology
Group’s directors and officers for failing to stop Marvell’s production of products found to
willfully infringe a competitor’s product, for failing to settle the lawsuit, and for failing to
inform shareholders before trial that Marvell was likely infringing a competitor’s patents. 42
The claims arise from a jury verdict, and subsequent district court judgment, that found
that Marvell willfully infringed two claims of two patents. 43 The court awarded $1.17

523 F. Supp. 2d 827, 842 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 864.
37
See In re RSA Security, Consolidated Civil Action, No. 18107-NC (Del. Ch. June 15, 2000).
38
See Verified Derivative Complaint at 1, Zomolosky v. Kullman, 70 F. Supp. 3d 595 (D. Del. 2014).
39
See id.
40
See id. at 2–3.
41
See Verified Derivative Complaint at 17, Zomolosky v. Kullman, 70 F. Supp. 3d 595 (D. Del [[R6.1]]
2014).
42
See Class and Shareholder Derivative Complaint for: (1) Breach of Fiduciary Duty; (2) Unjust
Enrichment; and (3) Breach of the Duty of Honest Services, Voss v. Sutardja, Nos.: 14-cv-01581 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 7, 2014).
43
See id.
33
34
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billion in damages. 44 The complaint alleges that the award granted in the case “has
impaired or may impair [Marvell’s] ability to pay future dividends to its shareholders.” 45
¶25
Mismanagement of the intellectual property of a corporation is a potential source of
liability for directors. 46 Directors must therefore ensure that they are fully informed about
their corporation’s material assets before they sell or dispose of them. However, the board
must also ensure that there is an effective system in place that allows it to monitor the
ongoing activities of the corporation.
C. Failure to Take Shareholder Vote – Van Gorkom/Apple Computer, Inc.
¶26

Failing to implement effective monitoring systems is one potential grounds for a
claim of intellectual property mismanagement, but there are other ways in which a claim
of mismanagement against directors can arise. For instance, the court in Smith v. Van
Gorkom formulated that:
[i]n the specific context of a proposed merger of domestic corporations, a director
has a duty under 8 Del.C. § 251(b), along with his fellow directors, to act in an
informed and deliberate manner in determining whether to approve an agreement
of merger before submitting the proposal to the stockholders. Certainly in the
merger context, a director may not abdicate that duty by leaving to the shareholders
alone the decision to approve or disapprove the agreement. 47

Hence, directors must make an informed, deliberate decision on merger proposals, and may
also be obligated to submit the proposal for a shareholder vote.
¶27
For instance, consider the case of Apple Computer, Inc. v. Exponential Technology,
48
Inc. Apple was Exponential’s largest shareholder when Exponential auctioned off fortyfive patents without prior shareholder approval. 49 Apple claimed that shareholder approval
of the patent sale was required under title 8, section 271 of the Delaware Code. 50 The court
found that Apple pled facts that sufficiently alleged Exponential’s failure to comply with
its statutory obligations by neglecting a shareholder vote. 51 If true, the court said, this
failure would constitute gross negligence. 52
III. WASTE – IN RE WALT DISNEY/ANALYTICA OF BRANFORD, INC.
¶28

Directors have the general responsibility of managing the assets of their corporation.
For example, section 122(4) of the Delaware General Corporation Law states that directors
See Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., 986 F. Supp. 2d 574, 582 (W.D. Pa. 2013).
The parties settled for $750 million on February 18, 2016. Jonathan Stempel, Marvell Technology to Pay
Carnegie Mellon $750 million over patents, REUTERS (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/usmarvell-technlgy-carnegiemellon-idUSKCN0VQ2YE [https://perma.cc/T5KV-3CGG].
45
See Complaint at 2, Sutardja, Nos.: 14-cv-01581.
46
Cf. In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 192 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
47
488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
48
No. 16315, 1999 WL 39547, at *17 (Del. Ch. Jan. 21, 1999).
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
44

210

Vol. 14:2]

Irah H. Donner

have the power to “sell, convey, lease, exchange, transfer or otherwise dispose of, or
mortgage or pledge, all or any of its property and assets, or any interest therein.” 53 Under
the doctrine of waste, directors can be liable for breaching their fiduciary duty when they
sell material assets for an inadequate price even if the business judgment rule applies. The
threshold to prove a violation under a waste claim is high. In order to be liable for waste,
the price that the seller receives must be “so inadequate in value that no person of ordinary,
sound business judgment would deem it worth what the corporation has paid.” 54
¶29
This strong language shows that waste claims are difficult to prove even outside of
the intellectual property context. Waste claims are generally made when a board decides
to sell or transfer assets for inadequate consideration. 55 Therefore, these claims generally
only apply to board action, not inaction.
¶30
Consider the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in In re Walt Disney, where the
shareholders tried to make a waste claim when the directors paid exorbitant amounts to its
president. 56 The Disney board of directors endorsed the Disney Chief Executive Officer’s
decision to hire a new president. 57 Fourteen months later, the new president was terminated
without cause and his severance package amounted to $130 million. 58 The court found
that even this substantial payment did not result in waste, because there was no proof the
payment was an irrational business decision. 59 The CEO contract did materially affect the
value of the corporation, but the transaction was not irrational enough to constitute waste. 60
¶31
The In re Walt Disney standard now applies to a number of scenarios, including those
involving intellectual property. For instance, consider Analytica of Branford, Inc. v.
Fenn. 61 Analytica of Branford (“AOB”) was co-founded by John Fenn in order to market
a patent which Fenn developed. 62 AOB eventually sued Fenn, claiming he engaged in
misrepresentations; Fenn counterclaimed, alleging AOB committed corporate waste by
entering into a contract with Yale University that provided AOB no benefit. 63 Quoting In
re Walt Disney the court noted, “[t]o recover on a claim of corporate waste, the plaintiffs
must prove that the exchange was so one-sided that no business person of ordinary, sound
judgment could conclude that the corporation has received adequate consideration.” 64 The
Court concluded that because Yale was actually the rightful owner of the patent, “Fenn

Delaware General Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112 (West 2015). Because directors
have the duty to manage the corporation’s assets, this means that directors have the duty to manage their
intellectual property assets as well.
54
Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1962).
55
See, e.g., In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 137–38 (Del. Ch. 2009)
(allowing a waste claim to go forward on the basis of the plaintiffs’ allegations that the board approved the
payment of a “multi-million dollar compensation package to a departing CEO whose failures as CEO were
allegedly responsible, in part, for billions of dollars of losses at [the company],” in exchange for which the
company obtained from the CEO non-compete, non-disparagement, non-solicitation, and release
agreements of allegedly limited value).
56
In re Walt Disney Company Deriv. Lit., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006)
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 75.
60
Id.
61
No. 03:96-cv-00736, 2007 WL 2221436, at *1 (D. Conn. July 27, 2007).
62
Id.
63
Id. at *2
64
Id. (citation omitted).
53
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[had not] presented any evidence that the . . . license agreement was ‘one sided’ and thus
of little benefit to [AOB].” 65
¶32
Similarly, in Swingless Golf Club Corporation v. Taylor, Swingless Golf Club
Corporation (“SGCC”) sued Roy Taylor over the use and transfer of four patents relating
to the creation of the swingless golf club. 66 SGCC allegedly owned the patents involved
in the club’s production, and Taylor was the former CEO of SGCC, as well as the inventor
and former owner of the patents. 67 Taylor counterclaimed, arguing that SGCC committed
corporate waste by misusing investor funds because SGCC failed to develop the product
for many years and never made any attempts to sell the product. 68 The Northern District
of California held that because SGCC neither developed nor attempted to sell the swingless
golf club, Taylor’s counterclaim was sufficiently plausible to survive a motion to dismiss. 69
¶33
Precedent on waste makes it clear that courts have afforded directors a great amount
of protection against these claims. Just like under the business judgment rule, courts tend
to defer to the board’s expertise when analyzing any claims against them. Despite this
deference, shareholders still pursue these claims. For example, in the Microsoft and
ContentGuard complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the director defendants seized valuable
corporate opportunities and prevented ContentGuard from growing by selling their
valuable assets for a nominal value. 70 Furthermore, in a more recent case, the Superior
Court of Delaware acknowledged that there may be an affirmative duty on corporate
officers and directors to monetize their corporation’s intellectual property. 71 This right
includes the ability to “vigorously defend [the corporation’s] intellectual property, through
litigation if necessary. [Furthermore,] there is nothing nefarious about a corporation
generating profits through its legal department.” 72
IV. SARBANES-OXLEY
¶34

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley Act”) imposes certain disclosure
obligations on public companies. 73 These obligations require that corporations have
effective systems in place to monitor and manage their disclosure.
¶35
Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires that the Chief Executive Officer and
Chief Financial Officer of a corporation personally certify the effectiveness of disclosure
controls and procedure. 74 Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires that issuers
include in their annual reports the scope and adequacy of their internal control system and
their procedures for financial reporting. 75 This obligates companies to establish and

Id. at *2–3.
679 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1063 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
67
Id. at 1064.
68
See id. at 1065.
69
See id.
70
See Stockholders Derivative and Class Action Complaint, Miron v. Microsoft Corp., No. 1149, 2005
WL 5769566 (Del. Ch. Mar. 4, 2005).
71
E.I. du Ponte de Nemours and Co. v. Medtronic Vascular, Inc., No. 09-058, 2013 WL 1792824, at
*10–11 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 24, 2013).
72
Id.
73
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7201).
74
Id. § 302.
75
Id. § 404.
65
66
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maintain adequate internal control structures and assess their systems’ effectiveness at the
end of the year. 76 Finally, Section 409 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires that issuers
make real-time disclosures to the public of any material changes to their financial condition
or operations, suggesting that directors must be aware of any material changes to corporate
assets in a timely manner. 77
¶36
Although the directors of public companies should be aware of these disclosure laws,
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act neither explicitly lists intellectual property as something that
directors must account for in their disclosure nor imposes any unique requirements for
intellectual property issues. However, because of the importance of intellectual property
to many companies, directors should not overlook their intellectual property when
accounting for their corporation’s assets. In the current industrial climate, if a corporation
experiences a material loss from an intellectual property risk and has not accurately
disclosed such loss in a timely manner due to inadequate controls, a corporation could face
significant exposure.
V. SECURITIES VIOLATIONS – IN RE AOL, INC./IN RE HP SECURITIES LITIGATION
¶37

Directors also may face liability for violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. 78 Violations under this
section of the Act occur when a person schemes to defraud others by making material
misstatements or material omissions in the sale or purchase of securities. 79 In recent years,
shareholders have brought claims against directors for their failure to release material
information about intellectual property assets they are buying or selling. 80
¶38
In In re AOL, Inc. Repurchase Offer, shareholders alleged that the AOL, Inc.
(“AOL”) management deceived AOL shareholders by entering into a common stock
repurchase program at artificially deflated prices while concealing material information
about their assets’ true value. 81 AOL’s management planned on monetizing a patent
portfolio, which would have caused a huge increase in value over what AOL’s books
allegedly indicated. 82 Shareholders alleged that they were tricked into selling their stock
shares prematurely to AOL at an artificially depressed price, while AOL secretly planned
to sell the stock for a large profit after the patent portfolio sale was complete. 83 Because
shareholders claimed the management concealed the true value and liquidity of their patent
portfolio from the shareholders, management faced potential Section 10(b) and 10b-5
See id.
See id. § 409 (“Each issuer reporting under section 13(a) or 15(d) shall disclose to the public on a
rapid and current basis such additional information concerning material changes in the financial condition
or operations of the issuer, in plain English, which may include trend and qualitative information and
graphic presentations, as the Commission determines, by rule, is necessary or useful for the protection of
investors and in the public interest”).
78
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016).
79
See id.
80
See, e.g., Class Action Complaint for Violation of Federal Securities Law, In re AOL, Inc.
Repurchase Offer Litigation, No. 12-cv-3497, 2012 WL 1537833 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2012),; Consolidated
Complaint for Violation of the Federal Securities Laws, In re HP Sec. Litig., No. 12-5980, 2013 WL
2630726 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2013).
81
966 F. Supp. 2d 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
82
Id.
83
Id.
76
77
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liability for their allegedly intentional scheme to defraud shareholders of the real value of
their intellectual property. 84
¶39
In another ongoing case, Hewlett-Packard (“HP”) bought Autonomy, a corporation
that allegedly had very serious accounting misrepresentations on its financial statements
regarding its intellectual property assets. 85 About a year after the purchase, HP claimed an
almost $9 billion loss. 86 The shareholders of HP brought Section 10(b) and 10b-5 claims
against the directors and management of HP. 87 They alleged that the defendants prepared
and approved the false statements of Autonomy’s asset valuation, which contained material
misrepresentations and failed to disclose material facts necessary in order to make the
statements truthful. 88
The shareholders alleged that because of this material
misrepresentation, they paid artificially inflated prices for HP stock. 89 Similarly, the
Securities and Exchange Commission recently filed a complaint against Christopher
Plummer (a member of the board of CytoGenix Corporation) and Lex Cowsert, (CytoGenix
Corporation’s president) individually, and against CytoGenix Corporation, claiming the
defendants lied to investors by issuing false press releases associated with an influenza
vaccine’s development when the corporation had already lost all of its patents in a prior
lawsuit. 90
¶40
These complaints make it clear that the directors and managers of corporations need
to have a good understanding of the corporation’s assets and manage them in a prudent
manner. This applies to intellectual property assets as well. If directors intentionally fail
to inform themselves of the value of their assets, they could face 10(b) or 10b-5 liability.
For example, if intellectual property assets are sold for significantly less than the alleged
fair value, then directors may face liability if they failed to obtain prior to the sale any
valuation of those assets.
VI. TRADE SECRETS – COMPONENTS FOR RESEARCH, INC. V. ISOLATION PRODUCTS, INC.
¶41

Boards should be aware that different duties arise with respect to disclosure of trade
secrets and disclosure of patents. Some assets are not innovative enough to be granted a
patent and may gain protection through trade secret classification. Directors should take
these differences into account when deciding to apply for a patent or keeping an asset as a
trade secret.
84
Id. Unrelated to the shareholders’ allegations regarding management deception, AOL’s motion to
dismiss was granted on the basis that the shareholders failed to plead facts sufficient to raise plaintiff’s
theory (that AOL’s auction of the patent portfolio was a sham) above mere speculation. See id. at 313.
85
See Consolidated Complaint for Violation of the Federal Securities Laws, In re HP Sec. Litig., No.
12-5980, 2013 WL 2630726 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2013).
86
Id.
87
See id.
88
Id.
89
See id. HP’s motion to dismiss was granted for claims arising out of statements made in a context that
did not require discussing the overall valuation of Autonomy assets and made prior to HP knowing of
specific allegations of Autonomy’s accounting fraud. Id. However, HP’s motion to dismiss was denied for
claims arising out of statements made about possible explanations for Autonomy’s weakness that did not
mention the possibility of accounting fraud, which were made after HP knew of specific allegations of such
accounting fraud. See In re HP Sec. Litig., No. 3:12-CV-05980, 2015 WL 4477936 (N.D. Cal. July 20,
2015).
90
Complaint, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Plummer, No. 14-CV-5441, 2014 WL 3543755 (S.D.N.Y.
2014).
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¶42

¶43

¶44

¶45

¶46

Irah H. Donner

Trade secrets have advantages over patents. They are not limited in time, whereas
most patents have a twenty-year limit. 91 There are no registration costs for trade secrets,
although keeping trade secrets private can be costly as well. 92 Finally, trade secrets are
effective immediately and no disclosure to a government agency is required. 93
However, trade secrets have some disadvantages. Outside parties may be able to
disassemble the asset and recreate it so they can use the asset on their own. 94 Patents allow
for the exclusive use of an asset, but trade secrets do not. 95 Furthermore, if the secret
becomes public, all people can use it. Protection of a trade secret is not as strong as the
protection afforded to a patent. Finally, an outside party may patent a trade secret by
developing the information in their own way. 96
These differences should be kept in mind when directors are determining whether to
apply for a patent or to keep the asset as a trade secret. Directors need to understand their
intellectual property asset and whether it will benefit the corporation more as patented
technology or as a trade secret. If directors are careless about applying for patents and lose
valuable intellectual property, they might face liability under the doctrines previously
discussed.
Similarly, directors’ duties pertaining to trade secrets are often analogous to those
covering other forms of intellectual property. For instance, in Components for Research,
Inc. v. Isolation Products, Inc., plaintiffs sought to enjoin defendant corporation from
misappropriating plaintiff’s trade secrets. 97 When defendant Joseph Bianco was
terminated as Components’ sales manager, yet remained one of plaintiff’s directors, he
began forming Isolation Products as Components’ competitor partly by taking
Components’ drawings and customer lists. 98 Components notified Bianco that his
corporation’s manufacturing trade secrets were disclosed to him in confidence and
demanded that they cease manufacturing. 99 The court found the evidence fully sustained
the conclusion that the defendants violated their fiduciary duty to Components, explaining
that “even in the absence of an express agreement against revelation of trade secrets, a
director is under a fiduciary duty not to use or reveal them to the detriment of the
corporation of which he is a director.” 100
On the other hand, the court in AccuImage Diagnostics Corp., v. TeraRecon, Inc.
found that the plaintiffs failed to allege a director misappropriated trade secrets. 101 In that
case, defendant Taylor was AccuImage’s Chief Executive Officer and executed a
“Confidentiality, Trade Secrets, and Assignment of inventions” provision. 102 Taylor

Patents or Trade Secrets, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/trade_secrets/patent_trade.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2016),
[http://perma.cc/67VX-7QFH].
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
241 Cal. App. 2d 726 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966).
98
Id.
99
See id.
100
Id. at 831.
101
AccuImage Diagnostics Corp. v. TeraRecon, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 2d 941, 951 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
102
Id. at 945.
91
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eventually resigned from this position and immediately began working for TeraRecon. 103
Plaintiffs claimed that after Taylor resigned, Boyd, an AccuImage board member and a
major TeraRecon shareholder, allowed Taylor to keep his AccuImage laptop, which
contained “highly confidential and sensitive proprietary trade secret information.” 104 Two
months later, TeraRecon demonstrated a new product that substantially resembled
AccuImage’s technology. 105 AccuImage claimed Boyd misappropriated trade secrets by
conspiring with Taylor to steal proprietary information. 106 The court concluded, “[e]ven
if Boyd knew of TeraRecon’s misappropriation of AccuImage’s trade secrets and
intentionally allowed Taylor to take his AccuImage laptop with him to his new
employment, Boyd still never acquired, possessed, disclosed or used AccuImage’s trade
secrets without express or implied consent.” 107
¶47
Overall, directors must familiarize themselves with the differences between trade
secrets and other forms of intellectual property, as well as their respective duties pertaining
to each.
CONCLUSION
¶48

As intellectual property assets become more significant to more corporations,
directors will need to be aware of the intellectual property assets of their corporation in
order to meet their fiduciary, and in some cases, legal duties. Currently, this area of the
law is largely undeveloped. Directors will lessen the risk of litigation by staying wellinformed on the status of their corporation’s intellectual property and recommended
practices when managing such intellectual property.
¶49
To do this, directors should ensure that their corporation has an effective monitoring
system in place that allows them to fulfill their fiduciary duties. For example, some have
suggested that companies:
• Familiarize CEOs and CFOs with the corporation’s IP portfolios so they
can make accurate and informed decisions;
• Keep board members and other directors informed to effectively oversee
such decisions;
• Involve IP counsel in overall IP management; and
• Implement an effective IP Asset Management Plan. 108
¶50

Of course, the nature of such procedures and/or systems will differ, depending on the
corporation and the intellectual assets it holds. Because of the uncertainty of the law,
directors should consider consulting intellectual property counsel regularly regarding their
duties.

Id.
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 951.
108
Abraham C. Reich & Steven J Rocci, The Lawyer’s Duty of Disclosure Ethics and Sarbanes-Oxley
the New Conundrum for Patent Lawyers, 1 AKRON INTELL. PROP. L.J. 43, 58 (2007).
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